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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gabriel Hinders appeals from the withheld judgment entered upon his guilty plea to
possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, Hinders claims the district court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
An employee of Triple Play, an amusement center facility, reported that a parked vehicle
was partially blocking an entrance. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-25; 7/3/17 Tr., p. 56, L. 18 – p. 57, L.
3; see also R., pp. 12-14 1.) Deputy Edwards responded. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-6.) Deputy
Edwards saw that the vehicle, a Chevrolet, was not parked in a parking stall and was blocking
part of the parking lot. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, L. 2, p. 12, Ls. 19-23, p. 15, L. 22 – p. 16,
L. 7, p. 44, L. 21 – p. 45, L. 1; 7/3/17 Tr., p. 56, L. 18 – p. 57, L. 3.) The windows were rolled
down and the keys to the car were in the vehicle. (Id.) One set of keys was on the driver’s side
seat and another set of keys was in the ignition. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 48, L. 25 – p. 49, L. 8.) There
was no one around the Chevrolet. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 2-5.) The Idaho returns system was
down for maintenance so Deputy Edwards was unable to run the Chevrolet’s license plate.
(5/2/17 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-20.)

1

Hinders’ Motion to Suppress focused only on the initial searches of the car. (See R., pp. 5256.) The testimony elicited at the suppression hearing focused on these initial searches. (See
5/2/17 Tr., generally.) Therefore, in order to provide full context to this Court on appeal, the
respondent has included citations to the report that was used by the magistrate to find probable
cause. (See R., pp. 10-24.)
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Deputy Edwards thought the car could be abandoned. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 13-15.)
Deputy Edwards entered the Chevrolet to try and find out who the car was registered to. (5/2/17
Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 11, L. 8.) Deputy Edwards entered on the passenger side and looked in the
glove box and found the registration. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 8-25.) The car was registered to
Mark Hinders, later determined to be Hinders’ father. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 11-16, p. 37, L. 23 –
p. 38, L. 2.) Deputy Edwards gave the registration information to central dispatch. (5/2/17 Tr.,
p. 17, Ls. 8-25.) Central dispatch attempted to contact both Mark Hinders and his wife, but was
unable to do so. (Id.)
After central dispatch was unable to contact the registered owner or the wife of the
registered owner, Deputy Edwards re-entered the car to look for documents indicating who might
have been driving the car. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 18, L. 12 – p. 19, L. 15.) Deputy Edwards was looking
for someone to contact in regards to the car. (Id.) Deputy Edwards found an employment
application with Hinders’ name on it. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 4-15.) Deputy Edwards attempted,
without success, to contact Hinders.

(Id.)

While Deputy Edwards was looking for more

information on who to contact about the car, he found cocaine. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 20, L. 19 – p. 21,
L. 9, p. 32, Ls. 2-10.) As he exited the car he saw, on the front passenger seat, under the glove
box, a clear plastic bag that contained a residue which he identified as cocaine. (5/2/17 Tr., p.
45, L. 20 – p. 47, L. 19.) He also observed two “cutdown straws” which are used to snort
cocaine. (Id.) Deputy Edwards also found some Xanax in the car. (R., pp. 12-13.)
Deputy Edwards spoke with Portnip Boyer, a supervisor with Triple Play. (R., pp. 1213.) Ms. Boyer told Deputy Edwards that she wished to have the vehicle towed. (Id.) A tow
truck was dispatched. (Id.) The Chevrolet was towed by Schaffer’s Towing. (Id.) Deputy
Edwards did a “tow/search” of the vehicle and located two empty alcohol bottles. (Id.)
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After Deputy Edwards found the cocaine he was able to view the security camera footage.
(5/2/17 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 16-25, p. 20, Ls. 1-3, p. 31, L. 19 – p. 32, L. 10.) The camera footage
showed the car being pushed into the parking lot. (Id.) The vehicle appeared not to be properly
working. (Id.) There were two people and another car in the video. (R., pp. 13-14.) Deputy
Edwards was able to identify the second car in the video and was able to contact Steven Raab,
the driver of the second car. (Id.) Mr. Raab told Deputy Edwards that a man had asked him to
help with his car and Mr. Raab helped. (Id.) Mr. Raab picked Hinders out of a lineup. (Id.)
Eventually the police were able to contact Hinders. (Id.) Deputy Edwards spoke with
Hinders. (R., p. 14.) Hinders agreed to speak with Deputy Edwards. (Id.) Hinders admitted it
was cocaine in the bag, but claimed it belonged to a friend. (Id.) Hinders also admitted to
owning the Xanax without a prescription. (Id.) The state charged Hinders with possession of
cocaine, and possession of valium without a prescription. (R., pp. 49-50.)
Hinders filed a motion to suppress arguing that Deputy Edwards did not have a warrant
and lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. (R,. pp. 47-48, 52-56.) The state responded.
(R., pp. 57-63.) At the hearing, both Deputy Edwards and Hinders testified. (See R., pp. 64-71.)
The parties filed supplemental briefs. (See R., pp. 75-93.) The district court entered its findings
on the record. (7/3/17 Tr., p. 56, L. 5 – p. 60, L. 25.) The district court found that the Chevrolet
was “somewhat” not in a parking stall and was “to some degree” blocking the ability of vehicles
and pedestrians to move in and out of the Triple Play parking area. (Id.) The Chevrolet “in the
parking lot was a hazard to some degree to other vehicles and people in that area.” (Id.) The
district court found that Deputy Edwards entered the Chevrolet “two or three times” in an attempt
“to find any documentation regarding the owner of the Chevrolet.” (Id.) On the last entry,
Deputy Edwards “noticed items that appeared to be consistent with contraband and seized those
3

items.” (Id.) The district court found that Hinders had standing to raise the Fourth Amendment
issue. (Id.) The district court also found that Deputy Edwards’ search was reasonable. (Id.)
Deputy Edwards was attempting to determine whether the vehicle was abandoned. (Id.) The
district court found that Deputy Edwards was lawfully in the Chevrolet and saw the contraband
in plain view. (Id.) The district court denied Hinders’ motion to suppress. (Id.)
Hinders pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp. 99-101.) The district court withheld
judgment and placed Hinders on probation for a period of two years. (R., pp. 105-108.) Hinders
timely appealed. (R., pp. 113-116.)
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ISSUE
Hinders states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hinders’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Hinders failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Hinders’ Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court found that Deputy Edwards’ search of Hinders’ vehicle was reasonable

because he was attempting to determine if the vehicle had been abandoned. (7/3/17 Tr., p. 56, L.
5 – p. 60, L. 25.) On appeal, Hinders argues the district court erred because he claims the district
court created a new exception to the warrant requirement and Deputy Edwards’ actions exceeded
the scope of any allowable search. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-12.) Hinders’ argument is not
supported by the record or the applicable law.
Deputy Edwards had probable cause to believe the vehicle could be abandoned and thus
was permitted to search for evidence of ownership pursuant to the well-established automobile
exception to the warrant requirement. (See, e.g., 5/2/17 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-25; 7/3/17 Tr., p. 56, L.
18 – p. 57, L. 3.) Further, he did not exceed the scope of a permissible search because it was
reasonable to keep looking for owner or driver information because his first attempts to contact
the registered owner failed. (See 5/2/17 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 8-25.) The district court did not err when
it denied Hinders’ motion to suppress. 2

2

While not addressed at the suppression hearing, Deputy Edwards also could lawfully search the
car as an inventory search when it was towed and impounded. Deputy Edwards had the authority
to tow Hinders’ car because it was a hazard and a Triple Play supervisor asked for the car to be
towed from their lot. (See 7/3/17 Tr., p. 57, L. 22 – p. 58, L. 4; R., p. 13.) Thus, Deputy
Edwards could have searched the card pursuant to a lawfully inventory search and discovered the
cocaine. “Inventory searches are a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.” State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 870, 276 P.3d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 2012)
(citations omitted). However this issue was not addressed during the suppression hearing.
6

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate

court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d
182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). The
appellate court defers to the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous;
however, the appellate court freely reviews the determination as to whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 345,
256 P.3d 750, 753 (2011) (citing State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197
(2007)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Hinders’ Motion To Suppress
The district court properly denied Hinders’ motion to suppress. Deputy Edwards’ search

of the parked Chevrolet was authorized under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.
1.

Deputy Edwards’ Search Was Authorized Under The Automobile Exception
Because Abandoning A Car Or Blocking Part Of A Driveway Violates Idaho
Statutes And Driver Or Owner Information Is Evidence Of That Violation

Hinders argues the district court created a “new exception to the warrant requirement to
‘enter into [the] vehicle a few times to determine who the owner was’” and in doing so, erred.
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) The district court did not create a “new exception” to the warrant
requirement, but instead properly applied the well-established automobile exception.
“Under the long-recognized automobile exception, police officers having probable cause
to believe that an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime may search the
automobile without a warrant.” State v. Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 575, 287 P.3d 210, 212 (Ct.
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App. 2012) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); State v. Gallegos, 120
Idaho 894, 897-898, 821 P.2d 949, 952-953 (1991); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 61, 266 P.3d
1161, 1166 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 120, 266 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct. App.
2011); State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 599, 237 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Ct. App. 2010)). “The two
primary justifications for the automobile exception are mobility and a reduced expectation of
privacy.” State v. Lovely, 159 Idaho 675, 677, 365 P.3d 431, 433 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied
(Feb. 23, 2016) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 39-393 (1985); State v. Gibson, 141
Idaho 277, 281-282, 108 P.3d 424, 428-429 (Ct. App. 2005)).
As an initial matter, Hinders argues that the automobile exception was not raised below
and should not be considered on appeal. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 9, n. 2.) This is not correct.
The motion to suppress raised the “automobile exception” and the basis for the motion was that
Deputy Edwards did not have probable cause to search the vehicle. (See R., pp. 52-56.) The
district court appeared to decide the suppression issue on the basis of the automobile exception.
(7/3/17 Tr., p. 56, L. 5 – p. 60, L. 25.) The district court did not use the words “automobile
exception”; however, the analysis utilized by the district court focused on whether Deputy
Edwards could search the vehicle to determine whether it was abandoned.

(See id.)

As

described below, abandonment violates Idaho Code § 49-1801(2) and investigating that potential
violation of Idaho law was the basis of the district court’s decision. (See id.) The automobile
exception allows police to search a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe there is a
violation of the law. Thus, while not precisely articulated by the district court, it appears that the
district court decided this case under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement.
Abandonment of a vehicle is prohibited in Idaho, including abandoning a vehicle on
private property without the consent of the owner.
8

§ 49-1801. Abandonment prohibited
(1) No person shall abandon a vehicle upon any highway.
(2) No person shall abandon a vehicle upon public or private property without the
express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful possession or control
of the property.
I.C. § 49-1801. Further, an officer can immediately remove a vehicle where that vehicle is
blocking or impeding traffic, is causing a hazard or has the potential to impede emergency
vehicles. See I.C. §§ 49-1804, 49-106(11). An owner who does not redeem the impounded
vehicle by paying the costs of removal and storage within seven days is guilty of an infraction.
I.C. §§ 49-1812, 49-1802(3).
Here, Deputy Edwards had probable cause to believe the vehicle had been abandoned and
was a potential hazard. Triple Play had reported that Hinders’ vehicle was partially blocking an
entrance to its parking lot. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-25; 7/3/17 Tr., p. 56, L. 18 – p. 57, L. 3; see
also R., pp. 12-14.) Hinders’ car was not parked in a parking stall and was blocking part of the
parking lot. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 19-23, p. 15, L. 22 – p. 16, L. 7, p. 44, L. 21 – p. 45, L. 1;
7/3/17 Tr., p. 56, L. 18 – p. 57, L. 3.) The windows were rolled down and the keys to the car
were in the vehicle. (Id.) There was no one around the Chevrolet. (5/2/17 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 2-5.)
Deputy Edwards had probable cause to believe the vehicle could be abandoned and commenced
an investigation. Idaho Code § 49-1802 creates a presumption that the last registered owner of a
vehicle is responsible for its abandonment. See I.C. § 49-1802. Deputy Edwards reasonably
attempted to contact the registered owner. After the initial unsuccessful attempt to contact the
registered owner, Deputy Edwards continued to try to determine whether the vehicle was
abandoned. This was allowed under the automobile exception because Deputy Edwards had
probable cause to believe the vehicle was abandoned and was therefore permitted to search the
9

vehicle for evidence of that abandonment. This comports with the findings of the district court.
(See 7/3/17 Tr., p. 56, L. 5 – p. 60, L. 25.) The district court found, in part, that Deputy Edwards
searched Hinders’ vehicle in an attempt to determine whether it was abandoned. The district
court explained:
The defense then said that there was just no authority to search this
vehicle. They cited various statutes in the 49 section of the Idaho code 49-1801,
49-1804, 49-1806, regarding when police may tow abandoned vehicles. 1801(2)
says you cannot abandon on a public or private property without the consent,
express or implied, of the owner. 1804 says the police – if the police have
reasonable grounds to believe the vehicle has been abandoned, they may remove
it. However, under extraordinary circumstances, if the vehicle is blocking
emergency exits or endangering safety, blocking or impeding traffic, or causing a
hazard it can be moved immediately.
The Court finds that the police just never got to that stage to determine
whether this was an abandoned vehicle or not. They were attempting to determine
that this was an abandoned vehicle. The Court is going to find that this was a
lawful search under the circumstances. That it was reasonable for the police to
enter into that vehicle a few times to try to determine who the owner was. To try
to be able to determine was it abandoned? Was the owner or operator going to be
able to come back and move that vehicle? Who’s responsible for it? Whether
they should tag it; whether they should just move it themselves.
(7/3/17 Tr., p. 59, L. 9 – p. 60, L. 8.) The automobile exception does not require that the vehicle
actually be abandoned before the police can search; the automobile exception requires the police
have probable cause to believe the vehicle could be abandoned in order to search. That is what
happened here. Deputy Edwards had probable cause to believe the vehicle could be abandoned
and thus he was allowed, under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, to enter the
vehicle to investigate the possible abandonment.
Hinders argues the search had to be limited to areas where the registration could be
found, and once the registration was found there was no justification for a continued search. (See
Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) Hinders’ argument is not supported by the record or the law. “The
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permissible scope of a warrantless automobile search ‘is defined by the object of the search and
the places in which there is probable cause to believe it will be found.’” State v. Kelley, 159
Idaho 417, 427, 361 P.3d 1280, 1290 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 824 (1982)). Registration or driver information can be located anywhere in the vehicle.
Here, Deputy Edwards was initially unable to contact the registered owner. (See 5/2/17 Tr., p.
17, Ls. 8-25.) Therefore it was reasonable to continue to look for contact information for the
driver or registered owner. The contraband was found in plain view while Deputy Edwards was
looking for driver or owner information. (See 7/3/17 Tr., p. 60, Ls. 9-14.)
In the course of attempting to determine these questions is when the suspected
contraband was found. The Court finds that the contraband was then seen in plain
view in a place where the police had a right to be; that is, inside the vehicle
attempting to determine the owner to determine the abandonment of the vehicle.
(Id.) Hinders has failed to show the district court erred. The district court properly determined
that Deputy Edwards could search the potentially abandoned car for owner or driver information
and was lawfully doing so when he saw the contraband in plain view. The district court did not
err.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the decision of the district court.
DATED this 24th day of July, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of July, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
TST/dd
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